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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Micah M. Haugland appeals from his conviction for felony driving under 
the influence. Specifically, he challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The police stopped Haugland for failing to stop for a pedestrian in a 
crosswalk. (R., p.16.) Haugland's vehicle smelled of alcohol and he performed 
poorly on field sobriety tests. (R., p.17.) Following a blood draw and a review of 
Haugland's prior history of driving under the influence convictions, the state 
charged Haugland with felony driving under the influence. (R, pp.17 -18, 33-35.) 
Haugland filed a motion to suppress (R., pp.38-40), and claimed at the hearing 
on the motion that the stop of his vehicle was not justified (12/19/2011 Tr., p.29, 
L.4 - p.31, L.2). After hearing, the district court found "the officer did have 
probable cause to pursue and cite the driver for violation of the code" and denied 
Haugland's motion. (12/19/2011 Tr., p.39, Ls.11-13.) 
Haugland pled guilty to felony driving under the influence, reserving his 
right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion, and the state dismissed the 
companion charge of violation of a pedestrian right of way. (1/31/2012 Tr., p.5, 
L.13 - p.22, L.21.) The district court sentenced Haugland to three years fixed 
followed by two years indeterminate and retained jurisdiction for 365 days. 
(3/12/2012 Tr., p.50, L.5 - p.51, L.6; R., pp.70-77.) Haugland timely appeals. 
(R., pp.84-87.) 
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ISSUE 
Haugland states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it concluded Officer Logsdon 
had probable cause to seize Mr. Haugland? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Haugland failed to show that the district court erred in denying his 
suppression motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
Haugland Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
Following a hearing, the district court denied Haugland's motion to 
suppress. (12/19/2011 Tr., p.39, Ls.10-13.) Haugland argues on appeal that the 
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress contending as he did below 
that "there was no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify Officer 
Logsdon's stop of Mr. Haugland as he did not commit a traffic violation." 
(Appellant's brief, p.11.) Haugland's claim fails. A review of the record, in light of 
the applicable legal standards, supports the conclusion that the officer had 
sufficient cause to detain Haugland. As such, the district court did not err when it 
denied Haugland's motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers 
to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free 
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards 
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482,485-
6, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306, 309 
(2004). 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
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Idaho 796,798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405, 
94 P.3d 709,710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
C. Haugland Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying 
His Motion To Suppress 
A routine traffic stop by a police officer constitutes a seizure of the 
vehicle's occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 
(1979); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205,208,953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Because a routine traffic stop is normally limited in scope and duration, it is more 
analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest and therefore is 
analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54. Under Terry, an officer may lawfully stop a suspect 
for investigative purposes only when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that 
the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; 
State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53, 961 P.2d 641, 643-44 (1998). 
Reasonable suspicion must be more than a mere hunch; it must be based on 
specific articulable facts and the rational inferences that naturally follow from 
those facts. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896-97, 
821 P.2d 949, 951-52 (1991). To justify the officer's detention of a defendant, 
the State is not required to prove the defendant's guilt on the underlying offense. 
State v. Kimball, 141 Idaho 489, 492-93, 111 P.3d 625, 638-39 (Ct. App. 2005); 
State v. Hollon, 136 Idaho 499, 502, 36 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Rather, the reasonableness of the police officer's suspicion is evaluated based 
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upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the seizure. United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417-18 (1981); State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930,932, 
829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509,515,37 P.3d 6, 
12 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Police stopped Haugland's vehicle in the course of a "crosswalk sting 
operation" where they were looking for vehicles failing to stop for pedestrians 
walking through crosswalks. (12/19/2011 Tr., p.8, Ls.18-20.) Two officers waited 
in parked vehicles while an officer in plain clothes used the crosswalk. 
(12/19/2011 Tr., p.9, L.21 - p.12, L.20.) The district court found the following 
facts at the close of testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress: 
I do not find that Officer Manning jumped - and that's not 
what it says, but he did not suddenly leave a curb or other place of 
safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close 
as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
This is a - what I would characterize as a 5-lane highway in 
the center of Hailey. So when he leaves the curb, in this situation 
he walks across the first lane of traffic, he's into the second lane of 
traffic close to the - the drawing indicates he's almost or right at the 
turn signal - or, excuse me, the turn lane boundary, so he has to 
cross what I would characterize as the turn lane before he is in front 
of the oncoming defendant's car. 
It takes long enough - the only testimony is that he was 
walking. It takes long enough to walk across a crosswalk that if you 
get across the first lane of traffic and you're across the second lane 
of traffic almost entirely, and a car is coming from the - you have to 
get over in front - you have to cross the turn lane and then you're 
over into what would be the third lane or fourth lane of traffic after 
you've left the curb, you've had to cross one, two, plus the turn lane 
to get in front of a car coming in what would be the fourth lane, that 
Officer Manning's actions cannot be characterized as suddenly 
leaving a curb or other place of safety and walking or running into 
the path of a vehicle which is so close as to constitute an 
immediate hazard. It couldn't work that way. 
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If this was a situation where the defendant was in the right-
hand land traveling northbound, he's in the far right lane closest to 
the curb, and the officer stepped out in front of him, or even if he 
was in the second lane and the officer stepped out in front of him 
and started off in front of him, essentially challenging the driver to 
stop or forcing the stop, then that might be a different situation 
where it could be argued that he had suddenly left a curb - Officer 
Manning had suddenly left a curb or other place of safety and 
stepped into the path of the vehicle and forced the issue, in which 
case officer has constituted an immediate hazard. I can't find that 
that happened here. 
(12/19/2011 Tr., p.35, L.11 - p.37, L.10.) The court denied the motion to 
suppress, concluding that "under the circumstances here, the pedestrian is 
already in the crosswalk, he's committed and he is moving, and it's up to the 
vehicle driver under that circumstance to stop and yield." (12/19/2011 Tr., p.39, 
Ls.6-9.) 
On appeal, Haugland cites to I.C. § 49-119(18) for his position that a 
driver need only give up right-of-way to a pedestrian "crossing an uncontrolled 
intersection" if there is "a danger of a collision." (Appellant's brief, p.7.) Idaho 
Code § 49-119(18) is part of the general definitions section of the traffic code and 
defines right-of-way as "the right of one (1) vehicle or pedestrian to proceed in a 
lawful manner in preference to another vehicle or pedestrian approaching under 
circumstances of direction, speed and proximity as to give rise to danger of 
collision unless one grants precedence to the other." I.C. § 49-119(18) 
(emphasis added). Idaho Code § 49-702, however, gives the right-of-way to 
pedestrians who are using a crosswalk. Idaho Code § 49-702 requires the driver 
of a vehicle to "yield the right-of-way, slowing down or stopping, if need be, to 
yield to a pedestrian crossing the highway within a crosswalk." I.C. § 49-702(1). 
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Idaho Code § 49-702 also provides that "no pedestrian shall suddenly 
leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run immediately into the path of 
a vehicle which is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard" and if they do, 
subsection (1) (granting the pedestrian in a crosswalk the right-of-way) would no 
longer apply. I.C. §§ 49-702(2), (3). The district court found the plain-clothes 
officer "did not suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety" in violation of 
Idaho Code § 49-702(2). (12/19/2011 Tr., p.35, Ls.22-23.) Haugland does not 
challenge this factual finding. Therefore, Haugland was required by Idaho Code 
§ 49-702(1) to give the pedestrian in the crosswalk the right-of-way and was 
furthermore required to slow down or stop, if necessary, to effectuate that act. 
The district court concluded Haugland was required to stop in this 
circumstance and he failed to do so. Reading the statutes together, the district 
court concluded "when a pedestrian is coming toward your lane of traffic, it does 
give rise to a danger of a collision unless one grants precedence to the other 
when the officer is a lane away or within one lane of the driver of this vehicle." 
(12/19/2011 Tr., p.38, L.23 - p.39, L.3.) The court's interpretation is consistent 
with other provisions of the motor vehicle code in which the Idaho Legislature has 
expressed its intent that motorists "exercise due care to avoid colliding with 
pedestrians." I.C. § 49-615. 
Because the officers' observations of Haugland led them to believe he 
was in violation of Idaho Code § 49-702(1) for failing to yield the right-of-way to a 
pedestrian in a crosswalk, police had reasonable suspicion to perform a traffic 
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stop. As such, Haugland has failed to establish that the district court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
denial of Haugland's motion to suppress and to uphold Haugland's judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
Dated this 8th day of March 2013. 
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